The U.S. Constitution Does Not Specify Three Co-Equal Branches of Government
Modern civic language frequently presents the United States government as a system of “three co-equal branches.” This phrase does not appear in the U.S. Constitution, the Federalist Papers, the notes of the Constitutional Convention, nor is it present in the political writings of any principal Founder. The framers constructed a system based on asymmetry, not equality, a layered architecture in which each branch possesses distinct powers calibrated to its purpose. This design reflects Madison’s vision of republican equilibrium — legislative specification, executive unity, and judicial interpretation arranged in differentiated layers.
The Constitution is a governance protocol specification, a ruleset with clear boundaries, enumerated powers, and structured upgrade paths. It distributes authority intentionally unevenly to preserve liberty through constraint and clarity. Over time, political habits, educational simplification, administrative growth, and judicial interpretation shaped the modern language of “co-equal branches,” which distorts the founding design. Restoring clarity requires returning to the text, the founding record, and the early constitutional experience of the republic.
To understand this architecture, we must begin with the Framers’ own theory, then follow its application through early collaboration among Hamilton, Madison, and Jefferson; the emergence of the first American political parties; the Neutrality Crisis of 1793; and the Pacificus–Helvidius debates. These events illuminate how the constitutional design operated in practice before later generations reframed the branches as peers rather than differentiated components of a single structure. The restorative aim of United States Lab’s research with United States Protocol emerges from this historical analysis, to reconnect citizen sovereignty to the architecture Madison authored, and to reinforce the clarity and function of the original constitutional specification.
Madison’s Architectural Design and Washington’s Constitutional Presence
James Madison approached the Constitutional Convention with a detailed diagnosis of the system’s weaknesses. His “Vices of the Political System of the United States” analyzed the failures of the Articles of Confederation: inconsistent state laws, weak central coordination, and an inability to secure national stability. From this analysis emerged the Virginia Plan, the blueprint that shaped the eventual Constitution. Madison envisioned a republic with a legislature possessing comprehensive authority to define national policy, an executive capable of applying that policy with unity and speed, and a judiciary that would resolve legal disputes within constitutional boundaries.
George Washington’s presence at the Convention, and later as the first President, gave practical form to these principles. Washington embodied executive restraint combined with decisiveness; he expected Congress to define legal boundaries and looked to the President’s role as one of applying the law rather than originating it. His adoption of Madison’s structure gave the Constitution early stability in practice.
Madison articulated the core logic of the design with exceptional clarity:
“A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions. This policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives, might be traced through the whole system of human affairs, private as well as public.
We see it particularly displayed in all the subordinate distributions of power, where the constant aim is to divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on the other that the private interest of every individual may be a sentinel over the public rights.
These inventions of prudence cannot be less requisite in the distribution of the supreme powers of the State. But it is not possible to give to each department an equal power of self-defense. In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates.
The remedy for this inconveniency is to divide the legislature into different branches; and to render them, by different modes of election and different principles of action, as little connected with each other as the nature of their common functions and their common dependence on the society will admit. It may even be necessary to guard against dangerous encroachments by still further precautions.”
— James Madison, Federalist No. 51
These lines are the interpretive key to the entire constitutional structure. They reveal a system built on differentiated function rather than institutional parity. Article I’s length and detail reflect legislative predominance. Article II’s brevity and unity reflect coordinated execution. Article III’s narrow scope reflects adjudicative precision. This is the operating pattern of a functional republic.
The Constitution as an Asymmetrical System
The plain text demonstrates the asymmetry. Article I grants Congress a sweeping range of powers: taxing, spending, borrowing, regulating commerce, naturalization, establishing the postal system, setting intellectual property rules, raising and supporting armies, organizing the militia, governing the federal district, and exercising the “Necessary and Proper” authority to implement all enumerated powers. Congress controls the structure of the executive departments, the size and scope of the judiciary, and the funding of every part of the government.
Article II establishes a President tasked with executing the laws Congress creates, conducting foreign relations, commanding armed forces within congressional authorizations, negotiating treaties with Senate consent, appointing officers Congress creates, and ensuring that laws are faithfully executed. The President’s power is purposeful, unified, and action-oriented, yet defined within the legislative framework.
Article III establishes a judiciary structured around cases and controversies. Hamilton described the courts with extraordinary clarity:
“Whoever attentively considers the different departments of power must perceive, that, in a government in which they are separated from each other, the judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them.
The Executive not only dispenses the honors, but holds the sword of the community. The legislature not only commands the purse, but prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be regulated.
The judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments.”
— Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 78
The judiciary interprets, but does not direct, policy. Its power flows from constitutional text and congressional legislation.
Together these Articles express a rational, layered design: legislative specification, executive execution, and judicial interpretation. They form a coherent system of differentiated authority designed to maintain equilibrium without requiring equal departmental strength.
Earlier Collaboration: Hamilton, Madison, Jefferson, and Washington
Before political divides hardened, Hamilton, Madison, and Jefferson collaborated closely in shaping the new republic.
During the Confederation period, Hamilton and Madison worked together to analyze weaknesses in the existing system. They shared a desire for a stronger national framework and collaborated in the movement toward the Constitutional Convention. Their partnership reached its peak in The Federalist Papers, where Hamilton wrote most essays explaining executive and judicial structures, while Madison authored decisive essays on republicanism, federalism and separation of powers, and faction management. Together they presented the Constitution as a coherent architecture to the American public.
Jefferson, serving as minister to France during the Convention and ratification, corresponded with Madison and supported the ratifying effort. Upon returning, he joined Washington’s Cabinet as Secretary of State, working with Hamilton (Secretary of the Treasury) and Madison (in Congress) to establish the early structures of the federal government.
Washington, as President, relied heavily on Hamilton for financial policy and on Jefferson for foreign affairs, while Madison initially collaborated with both to craft legislation. Their shared work led to the assumption of state debts, the establishment of the Treasury system, the creation of the judiciary under the Judiciary Act of 1789, and early administrative structures.
This collaboration established the practical pattern of legislative predominance, executive application, and judicial restraint that Madison envisioned, until philosophical divisions began to widen.
The Emergence of Faction and the Hamilton vs. Jefferson–Madison Rift
By 1791–1792, differing visions began to take clearer shape. Hamilton advanced a comprehensive financial program funding the national debt at par, assuming state debts, establishing a national bank, creating a uniform currency environment, and encouraging manufacturing. He believed national consolidation and executive decisiveness strengthened the republic’s stability and international standing.
Madison and Jefferson grew increasingly concerned that these measures elevated national financial interests above agrarian republicanism and empowered the executive beyond the original specification. They feared that consolidation would pull the republic toward monarchical habits and weaken local autonomy.
The Assumption Compromise of 1790 temporarily aligned the factions, trading the federal assumption of state debts for placing the national capital along the Potomac. But by 1792, the division became philosophical. Hamilton’s camp coalesced into the Federalist Party, and Madison and Jefferson’s camp formed the Democratic-Republican movement. Washington tried to hold his Cabinet together, but the intellectual tension grew.
This context formed the backdrop for the first major constitutional crisis.
The 1793 Neutrality Crisis: The Constitution in Action
France’s revolutionary government entered war with Britain and Europe, and the United States needed to interpret the 1778 Treaty of Alliance, originally made with the French monarchy. The treaty provided mutual defense obligations, but the monarchy no longer existed. Jefferson examined the legal footing, noting that the treaty’s terms were tied to the previous government. Hamilton considered the practical necessity of clarity in foreign affairs. Madison evaluated the issue through the lens of legislative control over war and peace.
The arrival of Citizen Edmond Genêt intensified the crisis. Genêt issued privateering commissions from French consulates, appealed directly to the American people, and attempted to bypass both Washington and Congress. The situation created a constitutional question of which branch determines the nation’s standing toward foreign powers?
Washington approached the crisis with deliberate restraint. He reviewed the treaty, consulted his Cabinet, and sought a path that aligned with American security and constitutional architecture. He ultimately announced that the United States remained in a state of peace.
This decision reflected the founding structure:
Congress creates the legal state of war or peace.
The President conveys that state externally and applies it.
The Judiciary waits for specific cases to resolve disputes.
Congress evaluated the issue and shaped statutory guidance through the Neutrality Act of 1794. The Constitution’s asymmetry functioned as designed, demonstrating how specification and execution interact.
The Pacificus–Helvidius Debate: The Constitution’s Logic in Public Argument
Hamilton writing pseudonymously as Pacificus, and Madison writing pseudonymously as Helvidius, then entered a public dialogue that illuminated the Constitution’s architecture.
Hamilton emphasized that diplomacy requires coherent national representation. Through the “receive ambassadors” clause, the President interprets diplomatic posture and conveys the nation’s intentions. He explained that neutrality declarations express the existing legal state rather than create it. Unity of voice and timeliness in foreign affairs form essential components of effective governance.
Madison approached the issue from the root of legislative authority. War, peace, and neutrality define citizen obligations and therefore originate in Congress. Neutrality is a legal state, not merely a diplomatic sentiment. The President expresses and applies it but does not establish it. He emphasized that legislative authority defines the republic’s legal posture, while the sovereignty and rights of the people stand as the source from which all constitutional power is derived.
The Pacificus–Helvidius debate, shaped by their earlier collaboration, revealed how the system operates: Congress specifies, the Executive executes, and the Judiciary interprets. The dialogue preserved the integrity of the constitutional structure and clarified the meaning of foreign-affairs authority for future generations.
How Co-Equal Branches Became a Later Interpretation
The modern idea of co-equal branches gained momentum long after the founding period. Throughout the 19th century, as the nation expanded and the federal government matured, executive leadership during crises and judicial influence through landmark cases shaped public perceptions of power distribution. The Civil War, westward growth, industrial transformation, and national emergencies gave federal institutions broader responsibilities.
The early 20th century saw further evolution. New Deal-era governance expanded administrative capacities, and civics textbooks adopted simplified diagrams presenting the “three branches” in parallel for educational clarity. Cold War rhetoric emphasized institutional cooperation, embedding the “co-equal branches” phrase in civic vocabulary.
Although these narratives provided accessible descriptions for a modern audience, they diverged from Madison’s original specification, where differentiation, not equality, formed the foundation of republican stability.
United States Protocol: A Restorative Architecture for a Constitutional Republic
United States Protocol applies the lessons of constitutional history to modern governance. Its purpose is alignment with the Founders’ architecture and the realities of contemporary civic life. Its design:
Reaffirms enumerated powers as the structural boundary
Positions the citizen as the sovereign root authority
Clarifies legislative predominance as the origin point of national posture
Preserves executive unity for effective application
Grounds judicial authority in adjudicative expertise
Establishes upgrade paths anchored in constitutional amendment and representation
Provides a modern architecture that reflects Madison’s source specification
If we are to instantiate the U.S. Constitution as protocol in parallel simulation, we need to start with the initial protocol design, and then upgrade it along the historical upgrade paths that manifest where the protocol is today. Having all pre-upgrade designs becomes critical for simulation, upgrade, potential future rollback and restoration of the design. As an academic research initiative, United States Protocol is a restoration of constitutional clarity within a modern technical and civic context.
Asymmetry as the Foundation of Liberty in a Free Republic
The Constitution’s stability and durability arise from its intentional asymmetry. Legislative power reflects the will of the people, executive unity ensures clarity and action, and judicial interpretation secures constitutional fidelity. The Neutrality Crisis and the Pacificus–Helvidius debates demonstrated these principles in practice, revealing the Constitution’s logic through the actions of Washington, Hamilton, Madison, and Jefferson.
The modern vocabulary of three co-equal branches differs from the Founding-era architecture. The Founders built a system grounded in differentiated functions, distributed powers, and layered safeguards, not symmetrical institutions. The republic flourishes when this structure remains clear.
United States Protocol continues this tradition by reinforcing the design Madison authored and reconnecting the citizen to their original station of sovereign authority within a constitutional order built for, and sustained by, We the People.
At United States Lab, we are implementing the United States Constitution’s compound republic governance model in web3. If you are interested in this research, please follow our R&D work.