Citizen Signaling and Referenda in a Polylithic Republic of United States
In the polylithic governance architecture of United States Lab, referenda and citizen signaling operate as verifiable inputs to a highly constrained, multi-layered governance protocol. Rooted in the constitutional tradition of a compound republic and informed by modern advances in zero-knowledge proofs and decentralized systems, United States Lab’s design reimagines referenda not as instruments of direct democracy, but as instruments of formalized intent signaling within a polylithic governance structure. This paper explores in detail the role of referenda in United States Lab‘s design, how they function within the layered execution stack, their alignment with both the theory and practice of constitutional republicanism, and how they reflect the Founders' original design of bottom-up sovereignty through federated constraint.
The Philosophical and Constitutional Basis
The U.S. Constitution enshrines the right of the people to petition the government for a redress of grievances (First Amendment), but it does not grant the people legislative power directly. Instead, it creates a system where all power originates from the people but is filtered through elected representatives. United States Lab preserves this core principle while upgrading the civic interface: citizens signal intent through zk-verified actions that can be provably attributed to qualified participants without revealing their private identities.
James Madison’s theory of republicanism was predicated on refinement and enlargement of public views. The system framers were wary of raw majority rule and centralized decision-making. Instead, they designed a compound republic in which layers of representation, checks, and constraints would restrain factionalism and safeguard minority rights. United States Lab’s framework builds on this by ensuring that referenda are not plebiscitary or majoritarian overrides of protocol, but carefully channeled inputs that trigger validator processes and constitutional checks. In doing so, we position referenda as a digital continuation of the founding principles—a controlled mechanism through which the people’s intent is received, considered, and acted upon within the structure of ordered liberty.
The Madisonian Model and the Loss of Interposition
At the heart of this system lies the Madisonian model, a structure where the people are the source of sovereignty, with that sovereignty exercised through a layered, federated, and constitutionally constrained architecture. James Madison envisioned a republic where institutional filtering via representatives, bicameralism, separation of powers, and state intermediation, would guard against the volatility of majority passions and factional dominance.
A key element of this model was interposition, the ability of state governments to act as a buffer between the federal government and the people. Before the ratification of the 17th Amendment in 1913, state legislatures appointed U.S. Senators, giving them direct influence over federal legislative decisions and the ability to interpose their sovereign will against centralization. This mechanism helped preserve the compound structure of the republic by ensuring that the federal government remained accountable not just to individuals directly, but also to their organized political bodies in the states.
"Nothing is more certain than that the tenure of the Senate, was meant as an obstacle to, the instability, which not only History, but the experience of our own Country had shewn, to be, the besetting infirmity of popular Govts. Innovations therefore impairing the stability, afforded by that tenure, without some compensating re-modification of the powers of the Government, must affect the balance, contemplated by the Constitution."
— James Madison, March 1836
The 17th Amendment removed this layer by establishing direct election of Senators, effectively severing the formal role of state governments in federal legislative appointments. This shift weakened the federated architecture and removed one of the most explicit tools of interposition available to the states. Although state legislatures retained some powers under federalism, their role as direct participants in federal governance was diminished.
United States Lab reintroduces this logic of interposition, not through traditional state legislatures, but through modular validator layers, constraint verifiers, and redress mechanisms. These protocol primitives functionally replace the lost safeguard by providing citizen-driven and constraint-bound means to filter, delay, or reject centralized action. The citizen does not command governance unilaterally, but may initiate action that must pass through the modern equivalent of federated review.
Thus, our approach to referenda and citizen signaling both honors and upgrades the Madisonian ideal. It reconstitutes interposition as a cryptographic check within a polylithic republic of sovereign validators.
How Verified Citizen Intent Is Filtered Through Federated Constraint and Protocol Execution
The loss of state interposition through the 17th Amendment can be understood in modern governance terms as a form of validator set Sybil attack. By bypassing the state legislatures and replacing them with a national popular vote, the original filtering mechanism of state sovereignty was effectively replaced with an unbounded validator population where coordinated mass influence could override federated constraint. Instead of each state appointing a unique and accountable validator (Senator), the system now allows centralized interests, coordinated media campaigns, or factional majorities to simulate consensus and distort representative fidelity.
This breakdown of interposition removed the ability of states to halt, filter, or challenge actions from the federal layer allowing validator capture by interests that no longer need to pass through institutional constraint. We addresses this design flaw by reintroducing interposition cryptographically, with permissioned validator layers, zk-proof challenge channels, and time-bound constraint verification that prevent unfiltered dominance by any one validator class or coordinated actor set. Validator sets cannot impersonate popular legitimacy without passing through layered constraint enforcement, ensuring that sovereignty remains bottom-up and filtered, not simulated by mass consensus or manipulated quorum.
Referenda in the U.S. Compound Republic Model
In the original (pre-17th Amendment) design of the U.S. Constitution the House of Representatives, directly elected by the people, reflected popular will. The Senate, appointed by state legislatures, represented sovereign state governments. The President, elected via state-controlled electors. The Constitution, only amendable through supermajority of states, not a national plebiscite (direct vote by the people on a specific issue).
This meant that sovereignty flowed bottom-up, from the people of the states → to their state legislatures → to federal institutions.
No national referenda existed in this system, because the people governed through filtered, federated, constitutionally bound institutions. The Senate, being appointed by state legislatures, embodied this indirect channel of power. The lack of national plebiscites protected the system from centralized or majoritarian overrides, preserving both federalism and minority rights.
When the 17th Amendment introduced direct election of Senators, it weakened this compound structure and shifted sovereignty toward a nationalized electorate. However, referenda were still excluded from the federal process, preserving the Constitution’s commitment to representation over direct democracy.
United States Lab acknowledges and revives this architecture. In its system, citizen referenda do not bypass validator layers. Instead, they mirror the original model of state-appointed Senators. Inputs must pass through multi-layered filters, respecting constraints, delays, and ratification requirements. In effect, we recreate the federated feedback loop using protocol primitives, rather than state legislatures.
The Role of Referenda in Polylithic Governance
We frame a polylithic governance paradigm in which authority is distributed across layers, actors, and protocols. Each "lith" or governance module replica, executes its functions semi-independently while preserving protocol-level cohesion through cryptographic coordination and constitutional anchoring.
Polylithic governance rests on the following precepts:
Layer Separation — Each functional layer (execution, validation, challenge, redress) operates with independence and transparency.
Protocol Interoperability — Governance module replicas interact through clearly defined interfaces, preserving constraint boundaries and avoiding centralization of execution logic.
Validator Pluralism — Multiple categories of validators (legislative multisigs, executive checks, citizen-challenge primitives) work in tandem.
Constraint Anchoring — All modules are bound to a root set of constitutional constraints, which may be verified cryptographically and publicly.
Composable Upgrades — New mechanisms may be added or amended without disrupting system cohesion, so long as they pass through proper ratification flow.
Referenda occupy the signaling layer of this polylithic system. They interact with:
Citizen ID & Reputation Subsystems (zkID, whitelisted NFTs)
Validator Execution Modules (Congress multi-sigs, Presidential veto layer)
Constitutional Constraint Auditors (zkSNARKs verifying scope compliance)
Challenge and Redress Layers (where any citizen may file a proof of invalidity)
This signaling layer does not control execution directly. Instead, it triggers multi-phase protocols that demand further filtering, validation, and public audit. By design, this limits the ability of any single input, no matter how popular, to subvert institutional constraints. A referendum may provoke review, require a legislative response, or even mandate action under constitutional rules (impeachment triggers, etc.), but it never supersedes the validator logic.
Types of Referenda
United States Lab classifies referenda into several categories based on their purpose and required validation flow:
Signal Referendum — Expresses non-binding citizen sentiment.
Protocol Referendum — Proposes governance upgrades; binding if validated.
Redress Referendum — Seeks to override a decision or impeach an official.
Epoch Renewal Signal — Triggers validator rotation or reapportionment.
Each type is bound by execution thresholds, audit trails, and ratification constraints. No type can bypass the representative structure.
Technical Flow of a Referendum
Citizen submits zkID-verified proposal.
Challenge period opens; zk-proofs may block invalid items.
Voting window opens; citizens vote anonymously but verifiably.
Validators review outcome: bicameral filtering, executive veto, constraint compliance.
Execution or denial occurs, with full audit trail recorded.
Reasserting Republican Architecture in a Cryptographic Age
In the U.S. compound republic, referenda were excluded because bottom-up sovereignty already flowed through state-governed layers. United States Lab restores this structure by allowing citizens to signal, but never unilaterally execute. Power still originates with the people, but it ascends through protocol, not popularity.
In doing so, we marry zk-verifiability with federated legitimacy, creating a continuation of the great experiment anchored in constitutional logic and cryptographic trust. Its adoption of polylithic governance ensures no single actor, layer, or input dominates the whole; instead, all civic and institutional signals are integrated through layered constraint, validator interoperability, and formal challenge logic. This is republican governance for a cryptographic age — distributed, durable, and immune to the tyrannies of both mob and machine.
At United States Lab, we are implementing the United States Constitution's compound republic governance model in web3. If you are interested in this research, please follow our R&D work.